Thursday 19 Nov 2026
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Distinguished guests, members of the judiciary, members of the legal profession, ladies and gentlemen, Assalamualaikum and good afternoon. It is a pleasure to be with you today at the Malaysia Legal Forum 2026.

Thank you Datuk Saravana for that kind introduction. I should add that Datuk is also a member of the Inner Temple. That brings me to a remarkable coincidence. It was on this very day, ninety-eight years ago, on 19 November 1928, that my great-grandfather, Almarhum Tuanku Abdul Rahman ibni Almarhum Tuanku Muhammad, was called to the Bar by the Inner Temple. [Pause] He went on to become Yang di-Pertuan Besar of Negeri Sembilan and the first Yang di-Pertuan Agong of this country. But before any of that, he was one of you. [Pause]

He was also the first president of the Kesatuan Melayu United Kingdom. Its honorary secretary was a younger student from Kedah, also named Abdul Rahman, also from the Inner Temple, who became our first prime minister. On Merdeka Day the Straits Times described my great-grandfather as the "much more serious" law student of the two. I will leave it to the lawyers in this room to decide whether that was a compliment. [Pause]

Today, I have been asked to speak on fiscal federalism: how revenue, responsibility and development are shared between the gederation and the states.

At first glance this is a technical subject. I would like to suggest to you this afternoon that it is something more. It is a question about promises: the promises a federation makes to its parts, and whether those promises are kept, in letter and in spirit.

Before I begin, I should say one thing plainly. I speak today in a personal capacity.

But I am also my father's son, and you will know that Negeri Sembilan has had a difficult year. In recent days there have been steps towards resolving matters, which I welcome. It would be wrong for me to argue them from this podium, and I will not.

I will say only this. The past year has taught me that the constitutional provisions most of us never read are the ones that matter most on the day they are needed, much like the boilerplate clauses in a contract.

A question with a long history

For my family, the question of how a federation should work is an old one.

Negeri Sembilan is itself a federation. Its name says so: nine states, bound together by adat and by agreement, with a ruler who is chosen and not just born to the throne. In each Luak, adat practices differ, most notably in how each elects its Undang. We were practising federalism, with all its challenges, long before Malaya had a constitution.

My great-great-grandfather, Almarhum Tuanku Muhammad ibni Almarhum Tuanku Antah, reigned as Yang di-Pertuan Besar from 1888 to 1933. During his reign the Federated Malay States were formed, and power and money began to concentrate in Kuala Lumpur. In 1923, he took the position that the affairs of the state budget should be determined in Seremban, and not in Kuala Lumpur.

The statute book shows what was at stake. In 1934 his son, Tuanku Abdul Rahman, gave his assent to the Negeri Sembilan budget for the following year. The two largest items in it were medical and health, and education. Between them they took a quarter of the state's spending. In 1934 a state paid for its own hospitals and its own schools. Today, both are federal.

My father, Tuanku Muhriz, returned to the theme in 2018. Tuanku called on the federal and state governments to seriously consider fiscal decentralisation, observing that Malaysia had become one of the more centralised federations. Neither Tuanku Muhammad nor my father was arguing for decentralisation in the abstract. Both were asking a practical question: if a state is responsible for the welfare of its people, should it not have the means to discharge that responsibility?

A little over a century after 1923, we are still asking it.

What the Constitution actually says

This audience does not need me to explain the Federal Constitution. But I would like to read its financial provisions the way an investor reads a balance sheet.

The Ninth Schedule divides the responsibilities. The states hold land, water, forests and local government: much of what makes a place liveable and investable.

The Tenth Schedule divides the money, and here the picture is very different. The first item on the list of state revenues, ladies and gentlemen, is revenue from toddy shops. [Pause] It is followed by lands, mines and forests, entertainments duty, and an assortment of licences and fees.

That is the revenue base of 1957, designed for an agrarian economy and largely unchanged. Income tax, corporate tax, sales and service tax, customs duties and petroleum revenue are all federal.

So the states depend on transfers. The National Finance Council under Article 108 must be consulted, but its advice does not bind. And Article 111 restricts a state's borrowing, in essence, to the Federation itself, or to short-term loans that the federal government approves.

Put together, the states have the responsibilities of a modern government, the revenue base of 1957, and a borrowing limit that prevents them from financing their own growth. Federal transfers to all 13 states amount to around 3% of the federal budget.

It is like asking someone to run a household on an allowance, with no salary, no credit, and one meeting a year at which they may express a view.

A federation rests on promises

This brings me to the first of two principles I would like to put to you.

For a federal system to work, the Federation must give effect to the guarantees that the Constitution gives to the states, to their institutions, and to their processes.

A guarantee, as every lawyer here knows, is worth only what the guarantor does when it is called upon.

Consider two guarantees that could hardly look more different.

The first is financial. Article 112C promises Sabah two-fifths of the growth in net federal revenue derived from the State, and Article 112D requires that grant to be reviewed. Last year the High Court found that for forty-eight years no such review had taken place. Parts of that decision are under appeal, and I say nothing about them. But the federal government does not dispute the entitlement itself. A constitutional promise went unexamined for nearly half a century.

The second is institutional. Article 71 provides that the federation shall guarantee the right of a ruler of a state "to succeed and to hold, enjoy and exercise the constitutional rights and privileges of Ruler of that State in accordance with the Constitution of that State". And any dispute as to the title to the succession, shall be determined solely by the authorities, and in the manner, that the state's own constitution provides.

Two features of that Article are worth noticing. The Federation is the guarantor of each state's constitutional order. And a guarantor is not the decision-maker: it is the state's own constitution that decides. This year the federal authorities have stated publicly and unequivocally where they understand the law to stand. That is what a guarantor does.

We tend to file the fiscal provisions under economics, and the institutional provisions under high constitutional law. But they are the same thing. Each is a term of the bargain on which the states entered this federation. A federation that treats some of its promises as optional will find that all of them can be doubted.

The same rules for every state

The second principle is this.

The Constitution gives Sabah and Sarawak a special position, for reasons of history recorded in the Malaysia Agreement, and that position must be honoured. Beyond that, every state is entitled to be treated on the same terms.

How well a state is heard in Putrajaya should not depend on which coalition governs it, on how many seats it delivers to the government of the day, or on how prominent it happens to be at the moment. It should depend on the Constitution, and on rules that are known in advance.

Optional (speaker's choice)

This is an old lesson. When the federation was being rebuilt in 1946, the committee that drafted it found that the rulers had sat in the Federal Council but "were able to take but little part in the debates". My great-grandfather kept that report among his papers. A seat at the table is not the same as a voice. That was true of the rulers then, and it is true of a state government today.

This matters more now than it once did. In the past twelve months the people of Sabah, Johor, Negeri Sembilan and, only five days ago, Melaka have each elected a state government. Sarawak votes next month. Each of these governments holds a mandate of its own.

A mandate without means is a hollow thing. And a grant that rises or falls with the political colour of a state government is not a grant. It is a reward.

Let me be fair. The prime minister has said that the federal government is open to working with every state government regardless of political stance. I welcome that.

But such a commitment is safest when it is written into formula and statute, so that it binds the next government as well.

Equal treatment does not mean equal amounts. Kelantan and Selangor do not have the same needs, and a fair formula will recognise that. It means the same rules, applied in the same way, whoever is asking. A referee does not give every team the same score. He gives every team the same rulebook.

What has changed, and what has not

Now, there has been real progress. The capitation grant has been revised for the first time since 2002. The whole of the tourism tax now returns to the states. Budget2027 raises transfers to RM12.6 billion, and Ecological Fiscal Transfers to RM270 million.

These are welcome. But notice two things. First, almost all of it was decided and announced at the centre. What is given by announcement can be withdrawn by announcement. A state cannot plan a ten-year water project on a one-year budget speech. Second, the capitation formula still counts heads. It does not ask what a state needs, or what it has contributed.

So the direction is right. The architecture, however, has not changed.

The state as host

Let me turn to investment, where I think the argument is strongest.

Malaysia is attracting investment on a scale we have not seen for a generation: semiconductors in Penang and Kedah, data centres in Johor and Selangor. By late last year Johor alone had approved 51 data centre projects, worth more than RM180 billion.

Consider what the host state contributes. It provides the land. It supplies the water. It approves the planning, maintains the local roads, and answers to its residents when the taps run low.

Now consider what the host state receives. Land premiums, quit rent and assessment. The corporate tax, the income tax and the service tax all go to the federation.

The state is in the position of a landlord who bears the wear and tear while someone else collects the rent.

This is not a grievance about federal taxation. It is a point about incentives. If a state bears the cost of hosting investment and sees little of the return, we should not be surprised when approvals are slow.

I come from a state that knows this well. Negeri Sembilan sits beside the Klang Valley. We absorb its growth: its housing, its factories, its traffic and its demand for our water. We are glad to. But we wish the fiscal system would take more notice.

So let me offer three ideas.

The first is a host-state dividend: return to each state a fixed share of the growth in federal tax collected within it. Article 110 already permits Parliament, by ordinary law, to assign any federal tax to the states. It is the same logic as Sabah's two-fifths: reward growth where it happens.

The second is to let states borrow to build. Article 112B already allows Sabah and Sarawak to borrow within the State. I see no reason in principle why a well-run peninsular state should not issue a sukuk for a water treatment plant or an industrial park, within national limits, with published accounts and independent audit.

The third is to pay for what is preserved as well as for what is built. A state that keeps its forest standing provides water security, flood protection and carbon storage for the whole country, and forgoes revenue to do so. At RM270 million shared among all the states, Ecological Fiscal Transfers do not yet outweigh a logging licence.

They should be scaled up, and given a statutory formula.

With arrangements like these, competition between states becomes healthy. States should compete for investors, for talent, and to have the best-run land office in the country. What they should not have to compete for, is federal favour.

Three routes to reform

As lawyers, you will ask how. Reform is often believed to be harder than it is. Some things need no change in the law at all. The National Finance Council can meet more than once a year, publish its papers, and settle grants for three or five years at a time.

Some things need only an Act of Parliament: assigning shares of tax under Article 110, placing discretionary grants on a published formula, and establishing an independent grants commission, as India and Australia have done, so that the referee is not also a player.

And some things need constitutional amendment: the borrowing rules in Article 111, and any reallocation between the Lists. These require two-thirds of Parliament, and therefore consensus across parties.

Most of the road can be travelled, before we reach the hard part.

The role of the legal profession

Ladies and gentlemen, this is where you come in.

This has been a year in which the Constitution has been front-page news. Questions that most citizens never had cause to ask have been argued in public: who appoints, who advises, who consents, and who decides.

These are not abstractions. They go to the standing of our institutions, and to the confidence that the public and investors place in them. And each time, the country has turned to the people in this room to explain, to advise, to argue and to decide.

That is a heavy responsibility, and I would ask three things of you.

First, read the unglamorous provisions. Part VII of the Constitution and the Tenth Schedule receive a fraction of the attention given to fundamental liberties. The Sabah litigation showed what happens when lawyers read them closely. It was a law society, not a government, that brought that public interest case.

Second, help to build the institutions that keep disputes out of your courtrooms. The courts are indispensable. But a federation that settles every disagreement by litigation is like a marriage conducted through lawyers. We have a saying in Negeri Sembilan: bulat air kerana pembetung, bulat manusia kerana muafakat. As water is shaped by the conduit, people are brought together by consensus.

Third, hold every government to the same standard. The Constitution binds the federal government when it deals with a state, and binds a state when it deals with its own institutions.

A mature federation is not one in which the Federation and the states never disagree. It is one in which disagreement is managed through trusted institutions, and promises are kept even when it is inconvenient to keep them.

Conclusion

The quality of our institutions will determine the quality of our growth. Investors read constitutions too. They ask whether the rules are stable, whether commitments survive a change of government or of personalities, and whether the authority that approves their land today will still have water to give them in ten years.

So I leave you with two principles and one proposal.

The principles are, one, that the Federation keeps the promises the Constitution makes to the states; and two, that every state is heard on the same terms, whoever governs it.

The proposal is that we stop funding the states by annual announcement and start funding them by rule: a share of the growth they generate, a formula that is published, and a body independent enough to keep it honest.

It is said that to give more to the states is to weaken the centre. I believe the opposite. A state that depends on the centre for everything will blame the centre for everything. The strength of a federation is not measured by how much the centre holds. It is measured by what its parts can build together.

Nor is this a new idea. It is the idea on which this federation was founded. The Malayan Union was rejected because it would have dissolved the states into a single centre. The Constitution of 1957 gave us a strong centre, rightly, for a young country in an Emergency. But it kept the states. What has happened since is a drift: one Act, one amendment, one administrative convenience at a time. Our politics has pulled the same way: in national parties of every colour, candidates for state office are largely chosen at the centre. And those who hold that office can come to answer to two masters.

I am not asking for a new settlement. I am asking that we honour the one we made, in letter and in spirit.

The answer does not lie in choosing between the federation and the states. A strong federation needs both: a centre strong enough to move the country forward, and states strong enough to carry their share of the load.

A century ago, my great-great-grandfather asked whether the budget of Negeri Sembilan should be settled in Seremban or in Kuala Lumpur. He could not have imagined data centres or semiconductor supply chains. But he understood something that has not changed: fiscal authority is the ability to take responsibility, and a state that cannot decide cannot be held to account. Today we can ask his question anew, not for Seremban and Kuala Lumpur alone, but for the Malaysia we want to build for the next generation.

That question does not belong to one political party, one government or one generation. It belongs to all of us. And for the next while, I suspect, it belongs particularly to you.

Thank you.

Wabillahi Taufik Walhidayah, Wassalamualaikum Warahmatullahi Wabarakatuh.

Tunku Ali Redhauddin ibni Tuanku Muhriz is the Tunku Besar Seri Menanti of Negeri Sembilan.

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