(Sept 10): Washington and Beijing appear to have entered a détente. After years of tariffs, technology controls, military signalling and acrimony, Presidents Donald Trump and Xi Jinping speak of a “constructive relationship of strategic stability”. Neither side expects friendship. The modest ambition is to place a floor beneath the rivalry, prevent accidental conflict and cooperate where interests permit. 

That would be welcome. From Southeast Asia, however, the question is what kind of order their accommodation would create — and whether Asean would shape it or merely live with the consequences. 

For the US and China, strategic stability is a bilateral concept. For Asean, it is experienced in semiconductor orders, investment approvals, coastguard encounters and political room. A thaw  could reduce uncertainty. It could also displace competition into the region as both powers seek leverage without confronting each other directly. Détente between capitals need not mean respite at the periphery. 

The case for stability begins with economic reality. China is Asean’s largest trading partner; two- way merchandise trade reached US$772.4 billion (RM3.12 trillion) in 2024, about one-fifth of Asean’s total trade. The US, although a smaller trading partner, is the region’s largest external source of foreign direct investment and a crucial market for higher-value exports. Asean’s prosperity is not attached to one economic pole. It is built across both. 

Malaysia embodies this dual exposure. In 2025, China was its largest trading partner for the 17th consecutive year, with bilateral trade of RM542.2 billion. The US ranked third at RM365.8 billion, while Malaysian exports there rose strongly, driven in large part by electrical and electronic products. Chinese demand, inputs and investment sit alongside American capital, technology and final demand within the same production networks. 

This is why calls for Southeast Asian countries to “choose” are detached from commercial reality. Malaysia cannot select the Chinese half of its supply chain on Monday and the American half on Tuesday. A circuit board or electric vehicle combines capital, equipment, intellectual property and customers from several jurisdictions. Strategic non-alignment is not indecision; it reflects how the regional economy functions. 

A credible thaw could therefore deliver real gains. More predictable tariffs and export controls would help companies plan beyond the next presidential announcement. Lower geopolitical risk would support investment and shipping. Restored military communications could prevent an air or maritime collision from becoming a crisis. Exchanges among officials, researchers and students could begin repairing networks damaged by suspicion. 

Yet interdependence is not automatically a peace system. Networks that make conflict expensive also create chokepoints. Washington can restrict chips, software and market access; Beijing can apply pressure through critical minerals, industrial inputs and consumer demand. A calm period may be used to reduce vulnerabilities rather than build trust. Once better insulated, either side 
may become more willing to confront the other. 

US-China history supports caution. Escalations have repeatedly been followed by efforts to “stabilise” ties. This proves both governments recognise the costs of rivalry. It does not prove   they have resolved the forces producing it. A relationship that keeps returning to the emergency room is resilient, but it is not healthy. 

Asean should resist the assumption that an agreement between great powers necessarily benefits smaller states. History offers many examples of the powerful arranging others’ interests. The danger is not a formal US-China condominium, but transactional bargains in which Southeast Asian concerns become negotiable because preserving the bilateral relationship is treated as the higher good. 

Taiwan illustrates the problem. Avoiding war in the Taiwan Strait is plainly in Asean’s interest. Conflict would sever shipping and technology networks, cause financial disruption and force excruciating regional choices. But stability cannot rest on unilateral reassurance to Beijing without reciprocal restraint. A Washington shift towards accepting Chinese sovereignty or constraining Taiwan’s self-defence, absent a reduction in military coercion, could weaken deterrence rather than strengthen peace. 

Nor should the future of 23 million people be treated as a bargaining instrument. Southeast Asian governments may avoid declarations on Taiwan’s status, but they have a direct interest in the principle that disputes are not settled by force and that affected populations are not incidental to great-power negotiation. Those principles also protect Asean members. 

The South China Sea is closer to home. An understanding that lowers the risk of a US-China naval clash would help. But if Washington’s pursuit of a wider bargain makes it less attentive to coercion below the threshold of war, claimant states could face greater pressure. Conversely, US policy designed chiefly to demonstrate resolve could militarise disputes requiring diplomacy and law. Asean needs neither American withdrawal nor permanent confrontation, but a balance that preserves navigation, respects lawful maritime entitlements and makes coercion costly. 

The claim that a more confident China will naturally become more restrained also requires scrutiny. Confidence can ease compromise, but it can equally persuade a stronger power that time is on its side. Asean should judge restraint by conduct: fewer dangerous encounters, less economic punishment, respect for international law and a meaningful South China Sea code. Confidence is a psychological claim; behaviour is evidence. 

 The correct Asean response to détente is therefore neither celebration nor suspicion. It is acceleration. A period of lower tension should be treated as strategic time in which the region strengthens its ability to withstand the next deterioration. 

First, Asean must deepen its own economic integration. Intra-Asean trade represented only 2l.4% of the region’s total trade in 2024. After decades of community-building, borders, incompatible regulations, uneven customs systems and services restrictions still prevent a market of nearly 700 million people from operating at its potential. “Asean centrality” will remain ceremonial unless the region becomes more central to its own prosperity. 

The Asean Community Vision 2045 offers a framework, but businesses need delivery: interoperable digital rules, faster customs clearance, mutual recognition of standards, freer movement of skilled professionals and financing that can connect regional supply chains. Greater integration would not detach Asean from China or the US. It would give the region more weight when dealing with both.  

Second, Southeast Asia must make supply-chain integrity a competitive advantage. As production shifts from China, the US is increasingly alert to transshipment and the relabelling of origin. Malaysia and its neighbours should not allow legitimate industrialisation to be discredited by opaque routing. Stronger customs data, transparent ownership, credible rules-of-origin enforcement and measurable local value creation would protect access to Western markets while welcoming productive Chinese investment. The objective is not to exclude Chinese capital, but  to distinguish genuine manufacturing from tariff arbitrage. 

Third, Asean needs a technology strategy beyond choosing an American or Chinese stack. 

Regional standards for data governance, artificial intelligence (AI) safety, cybersecurity and semiconductor traceability would enable interoperability while protecting national interests. Malaysia, with its semiconductor and data-centre sectors, must prevent export-control compliance from becoming an improvised, company-by-company exercise. Joint rules are more credible externally and less costly internally. 

Fourth, strategic stability must be regionalised. Crisis-management channels between Washington and Beijing are necessary but insufficient. Asean should press for practical protocols covering coastguards, naval and air encounters, hotlines and incidents involving civilian vessels. The long-delayed South China Sea code of conduct must be effective, consistent with international law and incapable of prejudicing the rights of states that are not party to a particular incident. Calm created by private understandings between two powers is inherently fragile; restraint embedded in regional rules is more durable. 

Finally, diversification must continue. Japan, South Korea, India, the European Union, Australia and the Gulf states are not substitutes for China or the US, but deeper ties with them widen Asean’s options. Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) should be treated not as rival geopolitical badges but as overlapping economic insurance. The more varied the region’s capital, technology, energy and export relationships, the less vulnerable any member becomes to a single power’s pressure. 

Malaysia can help set this agenda. Its 2025 Asean chairmanship produced the Kuala Lumpur Declaration on Asean 2045. The task now is to turn that ambition into coalitions of implementation. Malaysia’s credibility comes from precisely the balance the region must master: deep commercial ties with China, valuable technology links with the US, membership in both RCEP and the CPTPP, and a direct interest in South China Sea stability. 

An emerging US-China détente should be welcomed for what it is: a reduction in immediate danger. It should not be mistaken for reconciliation, a settled balance or a guarantee to Southeast Asia. The rivalry will continue through technology rules, industrial policy, capital flows and maritime power even if presidential rhetoric becomes warmer. 

Asean’s objective is not peace between Washington and Beijing at any price. It is predictable  competition bounded by law, with enough regional agency that Southeast Asia is not the arena, instrument or currency of their bargains. If Asean uses this breathing space to integrate its markets, harden its institutions and write rules others must respect, détente can pay a regional dividend. If it does not, the temperature may fall in the great-power relationship while the pressure simply moves closer to us. 

Abbi Kanthasamy is a Canadian entrepreneur, photographer and writer.