THE Strait of Malacca is no longer just a trade route — it is becoming a strategic bridge between Southeast Asia and the Middle East.

For decades, Southeast Asian countries have viewed the Gulf primarily as a source of energy. That perception is gradually changing. Economic, cultural and geopolitical considerations are shaping a more complex relationship. The structure remains asymmetric — Gulf states provide capital and energy, while Southeast Asia offers markets, labour, and logistics — but there are growing efforts to diversify cooperation into areas such as the halal economy, Islamic finance, and the digital sector.

Even so, this relationship has yet to mature into a full strategic partnership. Engagement remains largely bilateral and economically driven. Recent initiatives, including the inaugural Asean–GCC Summit in Riyadh in October 2023 and the second summit in Kuala Lumpur in May 2025 — which notably expanded into a trilateral format with China’s participation — reflect a growing political will to deepen ties. But institutional depth is still limited.

This evolving relationship is particularly visible in how Southeast Asia engages with political developments in the Middle East. On the Palestinian issue, there is a consistent baseline of sympathy across the region, shaped by shared anti-colonial experiences and, in Muslim-majority countries, a normative commitment to the cause. Yet this position is not uniform.

Many Southeast Asian states balance this moral stance with economic and strategic considerations. Some maintain trade and even security ties with Israel, while others calibrate their position in light of relations with the United States. Domestic politics also plays a role — governments respond to public sentiment and sometimes channel these issues into political competition. As a result, support for Palestine often remains stronger at the rhetorical level than in material policy.

A similar pattern can be seen in Southeast Asia’s response to the recent American war against Iran. Malaysia adopted a more vocal stance, criticising external aggression and calling for a ceasefire. Indonesia was more cautious. Most countries preferred neutrality, mindful of the perceived economic and strategic risks tied to instability — especially in key maritime routes such as the Strait of Hormuz. Singapore, by contrast, took a more critical position towards Iran’s response, reflecting its peculiar strategic posture. These differences point to a broader tendency: Southeast Asian countries balance political principles with economic stability and strategic flexibility, typically expressing their positions through calls for de-escalation, respect for international law, and reliance on multilateral frameworks.

In this context, the Strait of Malacca takes on a wider significance. For major powers like China and the United States, it is both a vital trade artery and a space of strategic competition. For Middle Eastern countries, it is a lifeline — a significant share of Gulf energy exports to East Asia passes through this route, making its stability directly tied to their economic security. Recent global tensions have only reinforced how vulnerable such chokepoints can be, raising the stakes for stable relations between both regions.

The question, then, is how to move beyond a largely transactional relationship.

A first step is to institutionalise dialogue through more regular and flexible engagement platforms. Interaction remains limited and often ad hoc, with relatively weak track-two participation. In many ways, the two regions still view each other from a distance.

The scope of cooperation also needs to expand — beyond energy and labour into logistics, port development, supply chain integration, and digital connectivity. Non-economic areas such as political coordination, cultural exchange, and people-to-people ties are equally important in building a more durable partnership.

Knowledge networks matter too. Stronger collaboration among think tanks, academic institutions, and policy communities can help shape a more coherent framework for cooperation. The Asia–Middle East Centre (AMEC) has contributed to this effort by organising dialogues on Asean–GCC relations, but such initiatives cannot remain isolated. Greater government support and wider institutional participation will be needed to move this agenda forward.

The Strait of Malacca should no longer be seen merely as a passage for goods. The foundations of a stronger Southeast Asia–Middle East partnership are already in place. The challenge now is for more actors to build on them — and to turn proximity into real strategic cooperation.

Dr Muslim Imran is the director of the Asia Middle East Center for Research and Dialogue.