This article first appeared in Forum, The Edge Malaysia Weekly on September 8, 2025 - September 14, 2025

As we outlined in “Australia and Asean: Time for Australia to reassess its regional order” (The Edge, July 21, 2025), there are a number of economic and political benefits for Australia to “pivot” back to Asia — and enhance our engagement with Asean as an external partner. This discussion highlighted the considerable economic benefits of embracing a new regional order deepened by a commitment to multilateralism. But this must also come with both self-reflection on Australia’s own past actions, and forward reflections on what it would need to do to be recognised by its neighbours in order for this “pivot back” to Asia to materialise.

Reflection requires constant double takes, the rethinking of previously held notions. Of course, this has happened partially throughout Australian foreign policy. The famous “pivot to Asia” under Paul Keating’s leadership in the mid-1990s, or the “Australia in the Asian Century” White Paper in 2012 outlining strategies to benefit from Asia’s growth, are well known.

A reflexive approach is necessary for such a shift in Australia’s foreign policy to occur. As Allan Gyngell and Michael Wesley have made patently clear in their book Making Australian Foreign Policy, Australia struggles to reconcile its Western alliance system with its Asian geographic location. This results in “strategic anxiety” which, in turn, produces poor long-term decision-making. They suggest the need to develop systematic policy formation and evaluation that includes multiple perspectives. What is urgently needed is to begin to understand how Australia’s actions are perceived by the different states in the region. Here, building institutional capacity for reflexivity into foreign policy is essential.

Reflexivity in foreign policy is often difficult, however. Borrowing from analyst Mark Neufeld, it involves questioning and examining the assumptions, values and perspectives that shape our understandings, and to consider how these may be unduly influencing our actions and interactions. It means taking both an inward gaze and taking the vantage point of others — stepping into another’s shoes and their minds. What do we really think of ourselves and what do others really think of us? What are their assumptions about us and their expectations? Is there a disconnect between expectation and reality?

Australia is not very good at asking itself these questions.

In 2022, when Solomon Islands signed a security compact with China, Australia was incredulous. It could not portend how this could occur — despite its relative neglect of the interests of the Solomon Islands for years. Across the Pacific, our neighbouring small island developing states will not soon forget the laughter of our senior ministers at their plight against rising sea levels.

Australia must do a lot better. Australia can play a leadership role in such a new configuration — one based on shared values of multilateralism, diversified economic strengths and collective influence. This calls not for an isolationist foreign policy but an independent and engaged regional agenda in which Australia behaves as, and is seen as, a good international citizen.

Documents like the 2012 White Paper should be reconsidered as being about what Australia can do domestically to strengthen itself and invite more reflexivity. Being a responsible middle power and good international citizen can transform tensions by collectivising problems across the region. It is no coincidence that Australia’s excellent leadership of the International Force East Timor mission (1999-2000) came at the high point of its positive engagement in the region.

But since then, the Tampa affair and ongoing refugee crisis, the illegal war in Iraq, Five-Eyes programme, poor periodical reviews under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, increased offensive arms spending, and our self-undermining of key principles of international law mean that while Australia may have a “self-perception” as a “country committed to a rules-based international order”, others may not share this view.

A key part is to actively recognise the legitimate concerns of our regional neighbours. More recently, Indonesia and Malaysia have both voiced concerns that the AUKUS security pact could precipitate an arms race and regional power projections, risking conflict and instability. Close readings of what other Asian states have said highlight the fundamental importance that Australia needs to keep asking how Asia views its actions and its decisions.

A crucial site for such re-engagement is Asean. Australia has been a dialogue partner since 1974, participating actively in key forums such as the Asean Regional Forum, East Asia Summit and Asean-Australia Special Summits. A high point was the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership signed in 2021, which elevated Australia as the first country with such status. This affirmed Australia’s commitment to Asean as a key partner in shaping the Indo-Pacific. But how do Asean member states tend to view Australia?

Relations with Timor-Leste, Asean’s newest member, and especially Indonesia are at an all-time high, with promises of mutual support (for example, Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese-Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto pledges) across trade, defence and critical minerals. Singapore remains close, with the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and annual leaders’ meetings. Similarly, Malaysia has decades-long diplomatic and economic ties — and both states are key partners with Australia in the Five Power Defence Arrangements, the longest-standing multilateral security arrangement in the region. Vietnam’s relations have been elevated with the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2024. Further afield, embedded relations with Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar or Brunei are less tangible.

But public sentiment varies — older generations across the region show more caution and Australia needs more youthful engagement to address this. Similarly, while surveys by ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute suggest Australia is viewed positively, it is not highly regarded in strategic importance.

A very simple start is to increase Australia’s aid commitment in the region. Currently, Australia’s commitments are almost insultingly low. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) suggests official development assistance (ODA) should represent 0.7% of gross national income (GNI) but Australia’s current foreign aid was only 0.19% of its GNI (that is, 19 cents for every A$100 of GNI) — one of the least generous of the developed world, according to Oxfam. The aid that Australia does give is usually tied to Australian benefits, either in personnel or economic linkages. This is not just an ethical issue but limits Australia’s voice in the region, and how Australia is perceived in it. Shared projects in education, research and cultural exchanges can promote people-to-people connections, fostering understanding and harmony among diverse nations. Directing more aid to building governance structure and forums for dialogue and cultural exchange will pay massive dividends in the long run.

Adding complexity, the historical effects of colonisation on certain stakeholders in the region will pose substantial challenges in forging trust-based, consultative terms. Notably, for Australia to confidently lead in this process, it must confront its entrenched British colonial ideology that has underpinned troubling policies in its history, ongoing inequities against indigenous Australians and those mirrored in various refugee and “strong border” initiatives. Rooted in race and white-dominated nationalism, Australia must nurture cultural security while embracing non-white cultures in its midst.

Australia faces a critical juncture in reassessing its foreign policy amidst a shifting global order marked by the rise of BRICS, Asia’s economic and political ascendancy, and clear signs of economic decline in its traditional partners and allies. Alliances with Western powers, such as through ANZUS and AUKUS, while historically beneficial, now risk entrenching Australia in a reactionary posture that is showing signs of undermining its regional standing and long-term economic and political interests. The domestic instability in traditional allies like the US, especially with the re-election of Donald Trump, and the potential greater tensions in global geopolitical affairs in the context of the relationship with China, highlight the need for a more reflexive, independent foreign strategy — one far more concerned with Australia’s immediate region and its organisations like Asean.

A reflexive approach involves not only introspection but also an empathetic understanding of regional perspectives. By embracing this mindset, Australia can pivot with meaningful engagement in the Asia-Pacific, fostering trust, collaboration and collective problem-solving. Investing in multilateralism, equitable regional partnerships and enhanced aid commitments, while addressing domestic legacies of colonialism and exclusionary policies, is paramount. It would be reckless for Australia to procrastinate on the realignment of its foreign policy towards building bridges and trust with our Asian neighbours.

This transformation demands courage and vision: to move beyond Western-centric paradigms, to reimagine Australia as a bridge between cultures, and to champion a stable, inclusive and prosperous Asian regional order. By doing so, Australia can secure its place as a responsible middle power, a respected regional leader and good global citizen.

Shannon Brincat is Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Studies, University of Sunshine Coast, Queensland. Ferdinand A Gul is Professor of Accounting and Finance, University of Sunshine Coast, Queensland; former Maybank chair, Faculty of Economics and Administration, University of Malaya; and former Distinguished Research Professor, Sunway University, Malaysia.

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