This article first appeared in Forum, The Edge Malaysia Weekly on August 11, 2025 - August 17, 2025

The reconsideration of nuclear power for Malaysia’s energy future transcends merely the choice of a new source of electricity; it stands as a powerful instrument for human and industrial transformation. For a country of Malaysia’s scale, asserting and maintaining autonomous control over such a critical technology is not just essential but imperative. Grasping this deeper strategic significance will be crucial in forging the nation’s vision, systems design and selection criteria.

Understanding the true cost of colossal nuclear power projects is paramount for any aspiring country. These are multi-billion-dollar, multi-decade commitments with dynamic price tags. China’s rapid nuclear expansion offers a telling glimpse into this financial complexity, revealing significant variations in construction costs even for seemingly similar projects.

A look at several recent Chinese nuclear power projects underscores this variability in cost per gigawatt of installed capacity (refer to the table).

These figures reveal that nuclear power costs are far from uniform. Even for the same Russian VVER-1200 reactor technology, costs vary significantly across sites or over time (compare Xudabao 1 and 2 with Tianwan 7 and 8). Moreover, projects utilising different technologies (Zhangzhou compared with Xudabao/Tianwan) can exhibit similar or higher costs, indicating that reactor type is just one factor. Other critical influences include project management, local supply chains, site conditions, regulatory changes and geopolitical shifts during the lengthy construction phase.

For countries embarking on their first nuclear journey, like Malaysia, this data serves as a vital caution. The initial cost estimate is merely a starting point. A comprehensive understanding of cost drivers and diligent risk assessment are indispensable. The true cost of nuclear power is a dynamic figure, shaped by technical, economic and geopolitical variables, demanding unwavering scrutiny throughout its multi-decade commitment.

When a major power offers to fully fund and operate a large, strategic infrastructure project like a nuclear power plant, Malaysian leaders must critically assess if its political significance outweighs practical benefits. The extensive timelines of nuclear projects necessitate continuous negotiations and numerous external factors — such as geopolitical shifts, public opinion or economic fluctuations — can easily divert governments from their initial course. Consequently, the political will of both the recipient and the provider is a critical, often volatile variable in project realisation.

Providing core energy infrastructure, especially through advanced technological endeavours like nuclear power plant construction, is a potent instrument for projecting national influence. These projects are more than mere commercial transactions; they become significant bargaining chips in bilateral negotiations. They allow technology providers to deeply embed themselves within the recipient country’s critical infrastructure, fostering robust, long-term diplomatic ties and potentially shaping foreign policy alignment.

This profound influence is particularly evident when a major power offers to cover “all plant funding and operation”. While such an offer removes the immediate financial and operational expertise challenges from the recipient country, it simultaneously creates a deep, multi-decade dependency. This dependency ensures long-term market access and significant technology export for the provider, guaranteeing steady revenue and global market share through decades of contracts for fuel, waste management, technical support and future expansions. By negating the need for the receiving country to build its own capabilities, it remains a perpetual consumer, effectively prevented from ever securing a place in the global nuclear supply chain.

For Malaysia, lacking domestic uranium, embracing nuclear power under such terms presents an even more profound strategic calculus. The country risks exchanging one form of energy dependence (for example, importing fossil fuels) for another — a potentially more geopolitically sensitive reliance on a foreign power for reactor fuel. This highlights a crucial, long-term strategic vulnerability demanding scrutiny by policymakers. However, uranium’s characteristic as a highly energy-dense fuel, easily stockpiled for years, offers a partial counterbalance.

Yet, the challenge extends beyond fuel supply to the very human and industrial backbone required. A critical contemporary challenge is, how can Malaysia swiftly cultivate and sustain the technical personnel needed for ongoing nuclear plant operation, maintenance and upgrades? The imperative for technology localisation is clear. This is especially critical given that current Malaysian university nuclear science programmes focus on non-power application, often lacking specialised subjects vital for power plant operation. Without robust home-grown capability, absolute reliance on external expertise risks ceding total control over critical infrastructure, thereby placing Malaysia in a vulnerable position. The journey into nuclear power must, therefore, be one of empowered self-reliance, not merely a shift in dependency.

The true feasibility and strategic wisdom of a country’s independent pursuit of nuclear power hinges not merely on technical knowledge such as reactor design or safety principles, but on a more fundamental question: the sufficiency of its local technology and industrial capacity. While a country like Malaysia can train skilled engineers and scientists to “take ownership” of the technical expertise, sustaining a robust nuclear programme demands a vast, specialised industrial ecosystem.

The nuclear supply chain is incredibly complex, demanding specialised materials, precision manufacturing of safety-critical components, unique construction techniques, certified labour, fuel cycle components and rigorous quality assurance. Currently, despite a robust manufacturing sector, Malaysia lacks the highly specialised heavy industry, advanced foundries and specific manufacturing capabilities for nuclear-grade components. Developing this formidable industrial base demands massive, sustained investment, decades of dedicated effort and substantial technological transfer.

For a country like Malaysia, relatively small in land area and population compared with giants like China or Russia, the decision to build local technology and industrial capacity for nuclear power is complex. While full fuel cycle self-sufficiency (covering every step from uranium mining to waste disposal) is unrealistic, a strategic level of indigenous capability offers significant advantages — enhanced long-term energy security, high-tech industrial growth, optimised lifecycle costs and robust safety oversight. Crucially, Malaysia must envision markets beyond its relatively small domestic needs. Without this broader economic rationale for scale, such development becomes economically unviable.

Failing to cultivate some home-grown industrial backbone for nuclear power creates perpetual dependence on foreign vendors — not just for construction but for lifelong maintenance, parts and upgrades. This absolute reliance on external suppliers for the entire industrial chain makes a country vulnerable to geopolitical shifts, supply disruptions, fluctuating prices and a crippling lack of control over the long-term operational costs and energy security. Therefore, cultivating this domestic industrial capability is essential for Malaysia to mitigate geopolitical risks and ensure continuous technical cooperation in its nuclear operations.

When evaluating a major power’s, or consortium’s, organisational capability to undertake large-scale infrastructure engineering, procurement and construction projects abroad, Malaysia should consider the following critical criteria:

•     Demonstrated scale and speed of execution: Assess the partner’s proven capacity to deliver large, complex projects efficiently and rapidly, both domestically and internationally

•     Integrated state-backed ecosystem: Examine the degree of cohesive government support, including concessional financing, rapid workforce mobilisation and robust domestic supply chains

•     Experience in diverse and developing markets: Evaluate their track record in countries with unique regulatory landscapes and infrastructure challenges, demonstrating adaptability and experience

•     Risk appetite and strategic long-term vision: Determine their willingness to undertake projects in emerging markets, coupled with a robust, multi-decade strategic commitment

•     Pricing competitiveness: Analyse their pricing structures, often driven by economies of scale, integrated supply chains and direct government support.

Offers that include full funding and operation might bypass typical competitive bidding processes that would evaluate the most cost-effective or practically optimal solution from a purely commercial standpoint. Such an offer can be seen as a way to secure a deal through political means, rather than purely economic competitiveness.

While a foreign-owned and operated plant might seem to mitigate immediate financial risk, its long-term implications demand rigorous scrutiny. Over decades, associated electricity purchase agreements or other obligations could prove far less favourable than a conventionally financed, domestically owned plant. A comprehensive financial analysis of the electricity purchase agreement, benchmarked against all viable energy options across the plant’s entire lifetime, is therefore indispensable.

Nuclear power plants, designed for an impressive 60-year operational life, present a unique challenge at their twilight stage. With remarkably few facilities reaching end of life, there is no truly mature or globally harmonised approach to decommissioning and long-term waste management. This absence of a proven, large-scale blueprint for handling the industry’s enduring legacy casts a long shadow over its full lifecycle cost and environmental promise.

In summary, while nuclear power represents a strategic imperative for sovereign countries aiming for energy security, decarbonisation, economic and geopolitical standing, this path is not without its intricate challenges. From colossal, dynamic costs and the imperative to build local human and industrial capacity, to the complex geopolitical considerations of foreign reliance and the enduring question of plant decommissioning, a comprehensive strategic vision is paramount for any country embarking on this journey.

Leong Yuen Yoong is director of sustainability studies at the UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network, Asia headquarters, and a professor at Sunway University. Feng Limin is director of operation and analysis division, Global Energy Interconnection Development and Cooperation Organisation.

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