This article first appeared in The Edge Malaysia Weekly on July 14, 2025 - July 20, 2025

AT the mid-point of his premiership, Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim finds himself struggling not just to deliver institutional reform pledges, but also to manage the unity government.

Simply put, his government is a coalition of coalitions that came together by necessity, not ideology. These are the number of seats held by members of the unity government:

•     The Pakatan Harapan (PH) coalition Anwar leads has 81 parliamentary seats now, of which Anwar’s PKR has 31, the DAP (40), Amanah (eight) and UPKO (two);

•     Barisan Nasional (BN) has 30 MPs. They comprise 26 from Umno, two from MCA and one each from MIC and Parti Bersatu Rakyat Sabah;

•     Gabungan Parti Sarawak (GPS) has 23 MPs; and

•     Gabungan Rakyat Sabah (GRS) has six MPs.

In short, because his PKR party and his coalition PH have to depend on coalitions like BN, GRS and GPS that they contested against in the 15th general election (GE15), Anwar’s time in office so far has been defined less by sweeping institutional changes and more by strategic compromises.

When he came to power in November 2022, expectations were high for deep institutional reforms. But since then, as reality set in, nothing has happened with the more challenging ones.

“Political reforms have moved slightly, with the passing of the Parliamentary Services Act earlier this year,” notes Aira Azhari, CEO of the Institute for Democracy and Economic Affairs (IDEAS). The restoration of parliament’s autonomy, lost since 1993, reinforces checks and balances within the Malaysian government.

Meanwhile, the abolition of the mandatory death penalty in 2023 and the decriminalisation of attempted suicide represent progressive strides towards human rights and mental health protection.

Yet, as with any government reliant on diverse political alliances, compromises have come at a cost. Crucial reforms remain stalled, mired in political sensitivities or resistance from the diverse parties within Anwar’s unity government. (See “Key reforms yet to be implemented” in table on Page 57).

Notably, the two-term limit for prime ministers, initially tabled in 2019 under the previous PH government, remains unrealised. Also, the fact that Anwar is both prime minister and minister of finance has raised concerns that he has consolidated power excessively. This dual role, critics argue, contradicts the promised goal of strengthening governmental checks and balances.

In its GE15 manifesto, PH had also promised that the nomination of the chief commissioner of the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) would be vetted by a bipartisan parliamentary committee. This has not happened as Anwar has in fact twice extended the tenure of Tan Sri Azam Baki, much to the disappointment of several PH supporters.

In fact, during the run-up to the PKR party elections, his daughter Nurul Izzah Anwar was quoted as saying that she would raise the matter with her father if she won. It is not clear if she has done so after defeating then economy minister Datuk Seri Mohd Rafizi Ramli.

In justifying the extension of Azam’s tenure, the prime minister had cited the MACC chief commissioner’s rare courage in going after corporate bigwigs.

Another unfulfilled GE15 pledge is the introduction of a Fixed Parliament Term Act. The Act was proposed to address uncertainty stemming from sudden dissolutions of parliament or state legislative assemblies before the end of their five-year terms. The Act, if implemented, would ensure that dissolutions only occur at the end of the term, thereby promoting political stability.  So far, Anwar has said the enactment of the law is not a priority for the government. 

“The record on political reform is limited,” states Prof Bridget Welsh of the University of Nottingham Malaysia, highlighting stalled efforts such as the Political Financing bill, which is designed to bring transparency to political donations and reduce undue influence. Despite draft efforts, substantial progress remains elusive.

Similarly, while the government has formed the media council, the jury is still out on whether it will promote press freedom or is just another layer of regulation that news organisations have to deal with. This is especially given that existing restrictive laws such as the Sedition Act 1948 still exists, with no real effort made towards its repeal and no significant legislative safeguards introduced to enhance media protections or civil liberties.

Furthermore, the Printing Presses and Publications Act 1984 that requires a licence for publishing purposes is still in place.

The separation of the Attorney-General’s advisory and prosecutorial roles is another critical institutional reform languishing in the planning stages. Such separation is vital for ensuring impartiality and independence in Malaysia’s judicial system, yet has still not been finalised pending formal study and legislative action.

Anwar’s reliance on powerful political allies, particularly Deputy Prime Minister Datuk Seri Ahmad Zahid Hamidi and influential Sabah leader Tun Musa Aman, has complicated public perception of his reformist credentials.

In many ways, Anwar appears to be caught between a rock and a hard place — trying to maintain a fragile coalition while preserving the integrity of his reform promises.

“Both the appointment [as the deputy prime minister] and the discharge not amounting to an acquittal (DNAA) for Zahid have served to reinforce the view that the Anwar government is focused on political survival, rather than reform,” Welsh argues.

Compounding these challenges is Anwar’s unity government dynamics. While internal pressures from PH partners like DAP and Amanah appear manageable, greater constraints emerge from BN and GPS.

“Bigger consideration needs to be given to PH’s other partners in the coalition, namely BN and GPS. Demands from within PH seem to be managed better, or rather, are not as consequential,” notes Aira.

Welsh, on the other hand, argues that the PH partners have not been effective advocates for political reform in government. “A good example of this is the call for the Chief Justice extension at the last minute [by DAP] — too little, too late,” she says.

Looking ahead, Anwar’s strategic shift towards wooing the semi-rural and B40 voters who did not vote for him in GE15 raises questions about his long-term electoral prospects. According to Welsh, “This focus has had limited impact to date due to the rising cost of living, and an inability to win over PAS’ traditional rural/semi-rural political base.”

With critical state polls approaching in Sabah and Melaka, Anwar’s political future and the sustainability of his coalition depend heavily on his ability to balance effective governance and political survival.

“Increasingly, the question being asked is whether Anwar Ibrahim was a reformer at all, as more than halfway into his term, there is little substance to point to, especially political reforms. Many question whether reform was a means to attain power rather than the end in itself,” Welsh says.

As Anwar navigates the second half of his term, which ends in December 2027, he faces a dual imperative: solidify a credible legacy of reform or risk becoming a cautionary tale of unfulfilled promises amid political compromises. 

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