This article first appeared in Forum, The Edge Malaysia Weekly on April 10, 2023 - April 16, 2023

When Vietnam invaded Cambodia on Christmas Day 1978, the founding five Asean member states were united in their opposition to the violation of Cambodian territorial integrity and sovereignty.

At the United Nations into the 1980s, these Asean states led a diplomatic front, with support from the US and China, against arguments the vile Pol Pot regime should no longer represent Cambodia, the principle of territorial integrity and sovereignty taking precedence over domestic bestiality.

Three things stand out from this Asean past. First, it took a principled stand against the invasion of one country by another. Second, genocide in the invaded country could not be a justification for the Vietnamese invasion. Third, Asean was able to organise itself diplomatically to pursue and defend a common foreign policy stand.

It all falls apart when we look at Asean’s conduct in international affairs today. On the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the now 10 Asean member states do not even bother to have a common position. This applies in other situations too, on the South China Sea disputes with China or even on Myanmar.

On Ukraine, there are in addition Russian support of irredentist and separatist claims, in Donetsk and Luhansk, within the territory of another sovereign state. Asean states should be mindful there are any number of such claims within the region, with potential support from outside parties, big or small.

Whether in southern Thailand, Mindanao, Sabah, Irian Barat, Aceh or the many tribalist assertions in Myanmar, Asean surely cannot countenance invasive interferences, such as the one by Russia in Ukraine, which member states tolerate without thought of the precedence set and of what could come to bite them at some point in the future.

This does not take into account tricky situations that could arise, and have arisen in the past in Indonesia in 1998 and in Malaysia in 2015, over the treatment of Chinese minorities that has antagonised China, although not involving any territorial encroachment.

The claim of affinities to break down boundaries based on language, religion, race and tribal affiliation, particularly when supported by powerful “protector states”, is one of the greatest threats to international stability in a system of global order based on state territorial inviolability.

Russia’s action in Ukraine violates this system of order. It puts at risk particularly smaller states that rely on the protection of international law to support that order — and their existence. It cannot be allowed to stand by adopting a “neutral” and “unprincipled” stand towards that action as most Asean states have done.

Even China winced over Russia’s actions in Georgia in 2008, and in annexing Crimea in 2014, as it has situations in Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang, which could be open to similar interventions.

On Ukraine, China has taken a more nuanced stand of “pro-Russian neutrality”, but it should be noted, while not condemning Moscow in this instance (because of developing geopolitical considerations in the bigger theatre of conflict with the US), Beijing has been consistent in upholding the principle of sovereignty and territorial integrity and in not accepting the threat of using nuclear weapons — as is to be found in its 12-point peace plan.

For Asean, it should at least have stated that it opposes Russian violation of Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity under any circumstances, as it did when Vietnam invaded Cambodia that Christmas Day in 1978.

Of course, there is the very important geopolitical background to the Russian invasion, ex-ante and ex-post, which Asean must also bear in mind.

There have been so many starting points to justify or to condemn the Russian invasion, some going into ancient times. But if, in the long run we are all dead, according to economist John Maynard Keynes, going into the far past will take us to a dead end.

It is critical for Asean to pick out the most relevant points in contemporary international relations when assessing the situation in Ukraine.

The most important is the sanctity of borders and respect for state sovereignty. With regard to Ukraine, this canon of international law and the UN Charter is augmented by assurances in the Budapest Memorandum in 1994 on its security signed by the nuclear powers, first the Russian Federation, the UK and the US and, latterly, China and France.

The occasion was Ukraine’s surrender of its nuclear weapons to Russia, in the name of non-proliferation then. Now the country is being battered with the threat furthermore by Moscow, not just against Ukraine, of the use of nuclear weapons.

This cannot stand and is unacceptable. Asean should say so.

However, the Americans and Europeans are totally not innocent in the wider geopolitical context, for raising, some have said goading, the Russian sense of insecurity by expanding Nato, after having promised in 1990 that the security alliance would not expand to include any of the Soviet Union’s Warsaw Pact partners following its collapse.

This welshing on a strategic commitment leaves Russia understandably aggrieved, even if it still does not justify the invasion of Ukraine and other aggressive Russian actions as in Georgia and Crimea. No amount of playing up Putin’s so-called megalomania — and this is a caricature — can conceal this.

This point about acting with contempt towards Russia, and the clear refusal of the Western powers to accord Russia its rightful place in the European order should also be noted by Asean as unacceptable.

Of course, there is a long train of history of Western ignominy, and particularly of American calumny — such as in Iraq and Vietnam — that is often brought into the argument. They are only too true but bear no relevance in the instance of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and certainly do not justify it.

However, what are deeply relevant to Asean are the post facto acts and decisions by the Americans following the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the nexus with deterioration in Sino-American relations as a result of the trade and tech war declared on China and the US policy of containment. The rise in tensions has increased the risk of a world war, starting in the Pacific over Taiwan.

American decline has been demonstrated by the ineffectiveness of its trigger-happy sanctions. There is now wider avoidance of the use of the US dollar in international trade settlements. There is a pattern of states from the global south drawing away from a monogamous relationship with the US. There are so many aspects of international relations today that show a resilience WITHOUT AMERICA.

China’s rise has become better evidenced as the war in Ukraine accelerated American decline. Again, Western commentaries about a new system of autocracies trying to replace the existing rules-based order are a caricature. Western academic and intellectual thinking continue to show misplaced assumptions and arrogance, except for a few now making spirited agitations against the US on social media — after the die is cast.

There is a sea change taking place which requires adaptation by Asean as by everybody else, including the US and the West.

Asean will be rightly concerned immediately about the impact of economic decoupling between the world’s two major powers, estimated by the International Monetary Fund to cost a reduction in world gross domestic product of 0.2% to an alarming 7%.  Asean always thinks economy first, as it does and did following the interruption in the supply and rise in price of essential commodities as a result of the war in Ukraine, but ultimately these factors could become the least of its worries in the face of the fierce rivalry between the US and China that has reached the highest level ever.

Not taking sides does not mean not taking a view. From its genesis to the invasion and the outbreak of war in Ukraine to the consequences in the international system to the very serious risk of a military conflict between China and the US, the world is fraught with hazard and mounting tensions last seen before the outbreak of World War I. Only this time, it would engulf the whole world and be truly calamitous.

What can Asean do? Much more than it is doing at the moment. Take a clear stand on territorial integrity and sovereignty. Non-acceptance of interventions, irredentism and separatist support. No heavy-handed imposition of sanctions. Better consultation in what is now no longer a unipolar world. More collaboration and cooperation in a multipolar world. Reduction of tensions and threats, more discussion on platforms such as those Asean affords.

All Asean should make clear is what it wants to see happen as the international order changes, hopefully peaceably. Asean not taking one side or the other between China and the US is well and good, but it should not be a cop-out.

There has been no Asean initiative or joint statement on evolving international matters of great moment. They cry out for attention at the very top, among the leaders, and not wait on the bland communiqués at the annual summits drafted by officials keen to stay out of trouble. There is trouble all around. It calls for Asean to develop a diplomatic front as it did in the late 1970s and the 1980s.

What is Asean centrality if it is not in the mix for peace particularly in dangerous times?

Tan Sri Dr Munir Majid is chairman of CARI Asean Research and Advocacy

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